Fundamentals of Knowledge

Can we know anything for sure?

Let's talk about the fundamentals of epistemology. Here's the Stanford Encyclopedia definition.

“Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. “

But is it even possible? Can we ever know anything? If so, what can we know? Let's examine this question first by defining some additional terms. As we define terms, we will begin to understand the subject.

Plausible

A belief is plausible if it is consistent with known facts. For example, blaming the society's problems on the rich and powerful is more plausible than blaming society's problems on mole men from the center of the earth. We may love that episode of superman. But the oppression by the rich and powerful is plausible because it is known to have happened before in history and the other is not.

Probable

This is a very common concept, and I only bring it up to make the distinction from plausibility. While the cause of the our problems could plausibly be the wealthy class, it isn't probable until some evidence is given for it.

Rational

This is when your beliefs and the way you justify them have no logical problem. For example, in John 14:6 Jesus claimed to be the only way to God. This is rational because the world's religions contradict each other and cannot all be true. This does not mean that the claim is actually true simply because it is rational. But it cannot be true if it is irrational. It is a different story if the way you justify the belief is also rational.

Warrant

This is a key concept that might be new for some. A belief you hold has warrant if you have some good reason for holding it. A key concept here is to realize that this is not the same as being correct. You may have true beliefs by guessing correctly. You might even have true beliefs by way of bad reasoning. In all of that those beliefs still lacked warrant. They were not warranted beliefs.

Defeater

This is the term for something that overrides the warrant for your belief and removes it in some way. Here is a classic example. Let's say that you look at a field and see a sheep. Therefore, you form the belief that a sheep is in the field. You now have a belief. You also have warrant for your belief. But now imagine that the old man who owns the field comes and tells you that there are no sheep in the field. He says that he has a sheep dog that looks very much like a sheep at this distance. Your experience tells you that this is a trustworthy farmer. Now you have a good defeater for your belief that is strong enough to override the warrant you previously held. I should add that there are undercutting defeaters as well as rebutting defeaters. I think those terms are fairly self explanatory. It's also important to understand that warrant might not be a rational argument, but a defeater may very well be just that.

Knowledge

This means that the comparison of defeaters and warrant comes out in favor of your belief being true. Here is Alvin Plantinga's famous example. Let's say you are accused of having committed a crime only yesterday. At the trial, a lot of evidence is provided to convince a rational jury that you committed the crime. And they would have good warrant for holding this belief. But ask yourself this. Would all of that courtroom evidence really cause you to believe that you committed the crime? Whenever I ask someone this, he or she usually laughs. You would of course still believe that you had not committed the crime simply because your warrant for holding the belief in your own innocence is stronger than the defeater provided by the evidence in the courtroom. A rational jury would convict you. But you would still be rational to continue to believe in your own innocence.

But if the evidence was weaker, this may not be the case. What if the crime supposedly happened ten years ago? Your memory might be foggy at this point. You might be persuaded by the evidence in court. Or what if the crime was only yesterday, but many witnesses you know to be reliable say they saw you do it from only five feet away? At that point you would begin to wonder if there are holes in your memory of yesterday. A stronger defeater or a weaker original warrant might be able to give a rational basis for changing your mind.

So this is where things get interesting. Alvin Plantinga refers to something Christian philosophers like Aquinas, Augustine, and Calvin have written about over the centuries. For our purposes we'll call it the sense of God. Do people sense God in some direct way? Is there a direct sense of God that's similar to the senses of sight or hearing? Based on the sense of God, we would naturally form the belief that God exists. And the larger question is whether or not this belief is warranted. Furthermore, does it also overcome its' defeaters? Plantinga argues that it actually does. A sense of God might sound dubious to many readers, but compare it to our other cognitive faculties.

Cognitive Faculties

This includes all of our tools for gaining knowledge. So it includes all of the five senses. It might include other senses such as a moral sense of good and evil. It certainly includes our memories, which were so important in the courtroom. It may include many other things. And of course it includes our A Priori knowledge.

A Priori Knowledge

Mathematical and Logical truths are not known by observation of the world. They function in a purely mental way. Here's an example. Imagine that you place 3 gold watches in a box in your attic. You wait one year, and then return to observe the contents of the box. But you now find four gold watches. You might conclude that someone placed another watch in the box. Or you might conclude that your memory has failed you. Perhaps you should have made a written record or even a video. But here is what you will never conclude. Under no circumstances would you accept that the number three is the same thing as the number four. This theory may be perfectly consistent with what you observe. But you'd rather say that some unknown property of quantum physics causes gold watches to duplicate before you'd agree that three equals four. There is a non zero probability that this would happen under the current understanding of quantum mechanics. But it is fantastically improbable. The primary point is that your observations simply have no ability to override this purely mental mathematical knowledge. Three is three. Four is four. This is A Priori knowledge. It is distinguished from A Posteriori knowledge, which is what your observations are.

So the question is whether the sense of God was dubious (worthy of being doubted). But we hold many beliefs on just as much grounds as the sense of God. Your own reasons are known to you. Perhaps there is even a sense of the thoughts or feelings of others, which some use the word “sympathy” to describe. Nevertheless, you of course hold many beliefs simply on your direct sense of them. I believe that I just ate a bowl of cereal. I base this on my memories of the experience, which I understood though many cognitive faculties at the time. But who is to say that the world did not simply pop into being 5 minutes ago with simply an appearance of age and all of my memories in place? If that is true, then I never ate the bowl of cereal. The bottom line is that there is room for doubt about the supposed eating of the cereal. Nonetheless, my belief in the earlier consumption of cereal does have warrant. My own memory serves as a warrant for it, and I'm certainly rational to hold this belief even if I cannot completely rule out the possibility of a five minute old world.

But what if our other cognitive faculties have the same problems as the false memory of cereal example. Our senses might be all suffering from a set of carefully crafted illusions. But it would be wrong to say that we have no warrant at all for belief in the reality of the past or the reliability of our other cognitive faculties. And so if you really do sense the divine, who is to say that your belief in God is unwarranted? To do that, a defeater must be presented.

Such defeaters are available. They have been argued for, so let's take a look at them. It has been argued that both the moral sense and even the sense of God are simply byproducts of the evolutionary process. Sometimes they are presented as beneficial for reproductions. At other times they're called spandrels.

Spandrel

While it means something different in architecture, in evolution this means something that is a byproduct of something beneficial. Living organisms are subject to random variations in offspring. Some variations aid reproduction better than others. These variations are inheritable in the suceeding generation of offspring. Therefore, the variations with better survival value will eventually spread throughout the population. But beneficial variations can have non beneficial byproducts called spandrels. All of the traits of an organism cannot be spandrels, but it's likely that at least some of them would be.

So the idea is that the moral sense, the sense of good and evil, is a spandrel in part. It benefits survival because we have a strong instinct to protect members of our species, especially the youngest. But at times this might produce a Mother Theresa, who dedicated her life to helping the extremely poor and did not pass on her genes. She had the drive that for most led to successful reproduction. But in her case it actually led to the death of her genes due to never being a mother. Thus her altruistic moral behavior is a spandrel. It might benefit humanity in general. Theresa called all the children she helped her children. But it couldn't be inherited. And it's argued that the sense of God has a similar explanation. Theories abound as to the evolutionary benefits of religious belief, but no theory appears to be dominant at this time. Nevertheless, let's simply assume that the sense of God has an explanation for thinking it is an illusory belief.

This is where things get really interesting. Would such a belief really carry much weight? In other words, the belief in our sense of God is warranted. So does this defeater based on evolution have enough strength to defeat the belief? Is it like the farmer or is it like the courtroom? It really depends on your personal sense of the God and how much warrant you give it brings with it.

So let's take a different look. What would it take in terms of a defeater for you to believe that you are not reading these words on a screen right now? That would probably take a really good defeater right? It's not inconceivable that such a defeater might be presented. Maybe some mountain of evidence will be trotted out. But until then, you have to believe that you can either trust your sense that you are looking at a screen or else you cannot. In the lack of a strong enough defeater, you must believe that you are looking at the screen. The key point Plantinga makes is along the same line. My own sense of God can carry the same weight.

And this is point where Plantinga really did something to current mainline epistemology. William Lane Craig describes this as dropping a bomb into the field. Please make sure you understand everything up to this point. He argues that if God does not exist, then the defeater is stronger. In other words, if my various cognitive faculties are the product of the evolutionary process, then they are aimed at survival value, not truth. This exactly what atheists are arguing when it comes to the moral sense and the sense of God. They argue that you can't trust your sense of God or moral sense. So they are arguing that you can't trust your senses because evolutionary theory presents a defeater for them. But, as GK Chesterton said, they are undermining their own mines. They are providing a reason to doubt the cognitive faculties from a view of atheism.

Atheists are arguing that our sense of God just had some sort of evolutionary benefit or at least was a spandrel. They are also arguing that our sense of good and evil was exactly the same thing. The point is that this sort of defeater is more like a wide scatter shotgun and less like a dart thrown at the wall. The obvious follow up question is this. What about my other cognitive faculties? Doesn't the defeater just presented affect them equally as much? At this point the atheists try to have their cake and eat it too. They argue that cognitive faculties like sight and memory are more likely to be aimed at truth because of the evolutionary benefits that come with that. So somehow evolution undermines some cognitive faculties while it provides a defeater for others. It's honestly a silly side step.

When I was at university, a neuroscience professor gave a guest lecture to my health class. One point he made was that we really should be afraid of cars instead of snakes. He was arguing that the fear of snakes was a sense of danger that we should doubt. Then the point can be pushed further by saying that people have evolved to be hyper sensitive to the presence of snakes. Thus perhaps we see snakes where there are none. Richard Dawkins often makes the point that our sense of God comes from our brains being wired to see people because of the evolutionary benefits of seeing people well. He argues that people hear God and see God. But he adds that this is defeated by his theory. Nonetheless, he is undermining sight and hearing.

Perhaps even logical reasoning should be doubted as well. Imagine that you are a woman. For some of you it will be easier. Let's say that your husband is a cruel man who beats you and your children daily. So you would be in a state of anxiety. You are constantly worrying about what to do as you try to resolve the situation. But your problem is difficult to overcome. If this mental state goes on long enough, then you enter a state called depression. Once this occurs, you actually become more relaxed and comfortable. You do this by simply accepting that your life is terrible. You stop worrying because you aren't trying to fix anything. But depression is a dangerous thing. Now when a great escape from your problems comes to you, you will sabotage it. Depressed people have a habit of sticking pins into their own life rafts. This is because they don't want to go back to anxiety. This can be so bad that the person will cause problems in his or her own life. So imagine that the abusive husband dies or goes to jail. The depressed wife will continue to be certain that her life is terrible. She will refuse to try to do anything good with her life and simply wallow in sadness and perhaps drugs all day. This is because the brain is working overtime to keep anxiety away. Depression often affects very smart people who are excellent at rationalizing their illogical behavior.

The point is that this type of defeater doesn't merely apply to a sense of morality or a sense of God. It applies to all of our cognitive faculties. It's a shotgun. It's not a dart. So here's the big question. Do these defeaters for cognitive faculties like basic senses of sight or reasoning overrule the warrant for these beliefs? Do you believe that you are looking at a screen right now reading words? Are these defeaters strong enough to make you think this sight and activity is no longer warranted?

But from a view of theism, God would create a world such that my cognitive faculties work. Theologians have long argued that the image of God in man means that man must be a rational being. Let's take a brief pause to give some of the history here. Theology is careful reasoning about God. As best I understand it, theology is only fully developed within Christianity and possibly Judaism. In the early centuries, the debates over the correct definition of the Trinity actually led to violent riots and government oppression. But Christians kept debating and came to a consensus. Muslims went a different route. For them the debate was over something called Tawheed. The argument centered around whether the Quran was eternal or created by God. This debate eventually led to violence and different sides gaining power. Eventually, one side gained military dominance and just declared a famous resolution to the debate. The answer to the arguments back and forth was that this was the way it is, and there is no explanation. Thus theological debate is said to have really come to a halt then and there for Muslims. It continued for Christians. By the late middle ages one debate was over whether God's intellect took precedence or God's will did. William of Occam, famous for his razor as well as the theory or inertia, claimed it was will. To Occam and the other anti-nominalists, God could do anything at any time with no plan. God could even do illogical things. To Aquinas, God was considered the most rational being ever. Therefore God's plan and reasoning took precedence. Aquinas' side apparently won the debate and science progressed under the view that the world functions according to a set plan.

I bring all of this history up to shine light on the fact that theology engages in centuries of careful reasoning and debate. One issue related to our discussion of trusting cognitive faculties is the rational actor problem. For man to act rationally in the world, there must be order in the world. Imagine that you lay on your bed and it is as hot as fire sometimes, and sometimes it is as soft as usual. Imagine that there is no rhyme or reason to it. Or let's say that rosebushes randomly transform into tigers for no reason at all. In other words, a world that functions according to set natural laws and good cognitive faculties are required for us to act rationally within it. For the God of theological theism, humans must be able to function rationally in the world.

Thus we come to the crux of Plantinga's point. If God does not exist, then I have a good defeater for my cognitive faculties. Therefore your belief that you are reading these words on a screen right now is unwarranted. But if God exists, then your belief that you are reading these words on a screen right now are warranted. Since the warrant for belief in reading the screen is so strong, then it is clear that the defeater of possible atheism is outweighed. It's like the court room example. All of the evidence might convince the jury of your guilt, but it will not convince you. Plantinga goes on to further argue that some beliefs may hold so much warrant that any possible future defeaters are overruled. But let's move on to other issues now. I want to take my own look at the same question from a different angle. So if Plantinga's reasoning doesn't sit well with you, just table it to consider it on your own later. I think most of his journal articles on the matter were written in the early 1980's. He has also written a popular level book recently covering this as well as many related issues called “Where the conflict really lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism”

Let's go back to that question of the moral sense. It personally amazes me that people who put so much weight on empirical evidence are willing to so quickly rule out this sense experience. At least stop calling yourself an empiricist if you are so ready to doubt the senses! The idea here is that we humans have no supernatural self. Rather, you are your brain. You are not a soul or spirit that uses your brain. But what exactly does this lead to? It leads directly to the consequence of no free choice. In this view of humans, we are really biomechanical machines. We move and function according to set principles and properties of the machine's components. Therefore, you do not choose your beliefs. Rather, you simply function according to the way you are built. Chemicals react. Particles have inertia and bump into each other. It's a mechanism.

If this is the case, then how do you know you can trust that your beliefs are honest and rational? This is actually a big problem. Any theory you come up with to confirm the trustworthiness of the beliefs given to you by these chemical reactions is itself a belief given to you by these same chemical reactions. This is called circular reasoning. That's a huge problem with coming up with a theory based on evolutionary theory that justifies the trustworthiness of the cognitive faculties. It's the same thing as saying the Bible is true because the Bible says so. But it is indescribably far worse since it literally applies to all of your thoughts.

So again we run into a problem where we can't know anything. This means that one has to put her atheism in a box and ignore it to do any work that requires knowledge like physics, engineering, psychology, ecology, sociology, history, even everything. Let's remember that most universities have some dedication to truth itself in their crests.

What atheists can argue is that this bat swings both ways. For, if the mere possibility of atheism undermines all knowledge, then the theist doesn't know anything about God either. But this fails to recognize Plantinga's point. It also fails on some other points about A Priori knowledge.

Let's delve into that purely mental world and examine our simple example. Three does not equal four. This is because we see clearly what these numbers are. They are really just ideas. And in a sense, we observe them. Thus the question becomes, do we have A Priori knowledge? At a simplest level, we must. Look at it from the other way. Is it possible that three and four are not equal? Most of us have done math problems where we thought we performed all of the steps of reasoning perfectly. But then we are told we somehow arrived at the wrong answer. Hopefully, we return to the problem and go over our steps repeatedly until we find the mistake. So although the math is purely A Priori knowledge, it's still possible for us to make mistakes and come to false beliefs.

But the case of three and four is a bit different. That's because there are no steps. All of the relevant ideas are really just the identity of the two numbers. In a way, you are simply observing both of the ideas at the same time. What this means is that it is possible for us to know at least some things. In logic, this is called the law of rational inference. The first principles of logic are that ideas have identities and that there are contradictory identities. Three and four have identities and they are not the same. So these are called the laws of identity and contradiction, which justify the law of rational inference.

But since we can at least know something, then can we go further? I think we can. Think of a more complicated math problem. Some problems involving steps might be sufficiently familiar to you that you see how it all fits together in one moment. It may take practice, but after doing the problem forwards and backwards, you'll begin to understand what I mean here. To me, this is where things get really interesting. The arguments for God's existence usually are just a deduction that follows from two ideas. Therefore, if you grasp those ideas well enough, then you can know that God exists. I am assuming here that the arguments for God are actually good arguments. But let's address whether they really are good at another time.

So if we can trust at least some of our A Priori cognitive faculties, then what does this say for the problem of atheists reducing our thoughts into biomechanical machinery? This view, called reductionism, leads directly and logically to circular reasoning. But we can be certain of at least A Priori knowledge. But reductionism cannot allow us to be certain of A Priori knowledge. On reductionism, that A Priori reasoning is really just a mechanical process that simply functions how it does. On reductionism, you have no tools to verify any of it. But if we can verify it, then reductionism cannot be true. On reductionism, you aren't really even aware of your thoughts. They are just a process that operates mechanically. But are you certain that the number three and the number four are not the same idea?

I could give other examples too. Oprah says all religions are true. But Jesus claimed to be God. Muhammad said Jesus is not God. Neitsche said God is dead. Hindus say everyone is God. The Buddhists say neither God nor anyone exists. Can Oprah possibly be right?

It becomes immensely obvious that you are certain of it. To do so, you simply have to be aware of the ideas. De Carte famously said, “I think therefore I am.” Perhaps we can progress his idea today and argue that you are aware of ideas and what they are. Nietsche said De Carte's statement should be modified to , “I think therefore there are thoughts” or even “There are thoughts.” Understand that either version doesn't change the fact that you can be aware of the numbers three and four. You are aware of the ideas. Your own awareness of the ideas is not something anyone else can prove to you. You are either aware of it or you are not. A Priori knowledge is included in a larger group called properly basic knowledge.

Properly Basic Knowledge

Here's an example to help us understand the subject better. Hold up your hand. You see a hand. But the real physical existence of a hand in front of you is possibly an illusion. Magicians have been known to do some incredible things, and who knows what new techniques they've developed? But here is what is properly basic knowledge. The fact that you at least see a hand, illusory or real, is properly basic. So even if the illusion of a hand is just an idea implanted into your awareness somehow, it is still something you are aware of. In other words, either the illusion or the actual hand exists, but there is something real beyond you.

Then the question becomes this. Do we know we see an illusion of a hand? Do we have knowledge of the illusion? So we return to the question of reductionism. Are we really just biomechanical machines? One problem is that this would undercut our own ability to freely choose what we think. But if that is the case, then our own thoughts are just the interaction of a machine's parts. We have no way to be certain that these thoughts are actually true or not. The machine just operates. It runs according to however it happens to be built. Nevertheless, I am aware of many ideas. And I am certain of the fact that the ideas of three and four are not the same ideas. So here's the question. If reductionism is true, then can I be certain of this? Reductionism would reduce all cognitive faculties to a justification that is fundamentally circular reasoning. I would be trusting the chemical reactions in my head because the chemical reactions told me to trust them. And yet, can we not be absolutely certain that 3 does not equal 4? Furthermore, can we not also be absolutely certain that circular reasoning is itself untrustworthy?

So the logic works like this. If reductionism is true, then we have no knowledge even of thoughts. But we are clearly aware of thoughts. Therefore reductionism is not true. Whatever humans happen to be, they are not merely biomechanical machines. To illustrate this more clearly, think about how machines operate. GPS navigation is a modern marvel. Take your phone and input an address. It will essentially think. It will access an online database of information, literally sense your location, and figure out what the best route is. But let's say that as you go down the road, you take a wrong turn. What will the GPS do? It will recalculate. It won't care if you ever reach the destination. It will just try to get you there. It will just operate. A computer chip is a network of switches called transistors. When voltage is applied the middle wire, then it can pass through the other two wires. These can be linked to each other and turn each other on and off. With enough of these, you can set up logical statements. If so and so then so and so. This can be set up to include a complicated set of “if then” statements. But ultimately the GPS in your car is a machine. It simply functions according to how it is built. Is it aware of ideas, or is it just a machine that's running?

The important question is whether you observe ideas. At the end of the day, you only really know for yourself whether this is the case. Part of the problem in answering this question is that it's difficult to really imagine what it would be like if we are simply biomechanical machines. You wouldn't really have thoughts at all. The machine would just function in your brain. It would take inputs through sensors like your eyes, causing it to function in some other way. These processes would then cause other events in your body. Aristotle said it like this. “Nothing is what rocks dream about.” So, do you dream at all? I'm just going to have to conclude that I do.

Maybe it will be easier to imagine a supernatural demon. Let's say that a demon implants thoughts in your head. You just think whatever the demon causes you to think. Therefore, how do you really know if 3 does or does not equal 4? But you do know. That's what's so interesting here. We just simply are aware of ideas. This is knowledge that is about as basic as can be. One might argue that we are programmed somehow and thus aren't aware of ideas. But this argument fails because I simply and plainly am aware of ideas. It's not that anything else justifies them. I'm just aware of them. Even if a demon is causing my thoughts, perhaps I simply am that demon!

At this point, I'm hoping to move on to some related questions. Basically, there is good evidence that our thought life is somehow controlled by our physical brains. I once watched a surgery where a man had brain damage and could no longer play the banjo. While he was awake and attempting to play, they had his skull cut open. They were reconnecting nerves in his brain like wires. They literally were listening to him play to see if they were connecting the correct wires. It was incredible. He suddenly played correctly and they said, alright I think we got it fixed. I wanted to hand them a wrench.

But this doesn't actually demonstrate that we are biomechanical machines. The neuroscientist who came to my health class said something that was accidentally helpful. He said that we don't use our brains, we are our brains. It's funny, but if we merely use our brains to aid in our thinking, then our brains could affect our spiritual self. Specifically, the thoughts the spiritual self is aware of would come through a sort of middle man of a brain. Thus while the spirit may have plenty of say in things, it could still be heavily affected by the brain. In other words, you can't use information you aren't aware of. If the brain only gives you some ideas or sense experiences, then your spirit can't act based on any others. And this sort of manipulation can get really complicated. The funny thing is that the Bible has always taught that the human thought life has a fleshly side as well as a spiritual one. De Carte even believed this.

There are other questions along these lines. For example, how can a spiritual soul interact with a physical brain? If my brain controls my body and all bodily actions can be traced back to actions in the brain, then how does my spiritual self control my body? This might not be as big of a problem as you might think. But this does require a bit of theology. There are different views on God's interaction with the world. Science doesn't tell us that miracles are impossible. All of the laws of physics are for closed systems. But what if God just inputs more matter or energy into the system? It is believed that science debunks such a notion. But it actually doesn't. That's a bit of philosophy that's stapled on to the science.

The belief that God can't add matter or energy to the system is a metaphysical or theological addition to physics. It is not part of physics. Metaphysics deals with understanding what existence really is. Laplace argued that the entire universe can be a huge machine of physical processes running according to scientific laws. But couldn't God enter new matter or energy into the machine? Laplace argued that since the machine can be understood without God doing that, then God is an unnecessary hypothesis. In other words, Laplace was doing metaphysics here. He was doing philosophy just like we have. He wasn't doing physics. He was reasoning about larger questions of existence. And his reasoning wasn't so strong. It was more of a semantic argument, which is an incredibly weak one. In other words, he was playing language games. All he really simply said was that it's possible God doesn't exist. He just found another way to word it.

But theologians have provided different theological defenses for Laplace's closed universe view. One is the rational actor problem. If God is constantly performing miracles, then the universe doesn't function according to regular natural laws. So some argue that therefore God set it all up at creation like a machine that will run in the way He planned. But this argument has a hole. It does nothing to prevent God from performing the odd miracle here and there.

Another argument claims that God would have set up the universe in the first place, so why would God ever change anything? I personally am partial to this. I favor this view. To me, a greater God is one who planned every miracle in how He created the universe. There are just more undiscovered properties of the universe that make the miracles scientifically normal. But a response against me is that God might be more of a spontaneous romantic painter. Why else create so many types of beetles or have the sun come up again every morning?

Nonetheless, I still favor the view that all miracles are actually scientifically normal, and that we just don't understand how the world works well enough. Therefore, the more we push God back and can explain without a miracle, the greater God must be. The world isn't some puzzle that only allows God in the missing areas where we haven't put it together yet. God must exist because we have good arguments for God's existence. And a greater God would be pushed back further and further, therefore having planned more and more in the very creation of the world.

That's where we come in. Allow me to introduce something new here. It's possible that we have spiritual selves. And it's possible that our spirits have no control whatsoever over our physical bodies. It's possible that our brains control all of our bodies' actions and yet we are embodied souls. Rather, God could have simply foreknown our spiritual thoughts and decisions, and created the world such that our bodies would one day exist in just the right way. Thus the machine of our brains would literally only correlate to our spirits choices, but not be caused by them. Instead there would be a third cause, God's creation of the universe. You see, Laplace's point was that if one knew all the positions, velocities and properties of all the matter in the universe, that one could predict all future events. All physical matter just functions according to its' properties. Oxygen binds with hydrogen because of it's chemical properties. Rocks fall from cliffs. Stars form, burn and explode. And the chemicals in your brain react in an incredibly complicated way. God, being a being beyond time itself, could literally have simply known what you would do in the future and caused your body to come to be in just such a way that it would act as it does. So right now your spirit chooses to lift your hand. God, knowing this from a point transcending time would have created the universe in such a way as to cause your hand to move in just the way you now choose.

The theological implication of this is an astounding one. God's really in control. The funny thing is this though. This weird idea of spiritual correlation isn't so different from just saying God is all powerful. One final question is how exactly this view I'm proposing is any different from reductionism itself. Hopefully that has been covered. It's the thought life and awareness of ideas that's essential to the difference. One such thought we didn't discuss is the moral sense of good and evil. What is morality exactly? At the very least, it's a call to make good choices. But what exactly does a machine do with this input? Let's state this more formally. Programming a machine to be good is the same as forcing it to freely choose to be good. That's what morality is. The idea of morality clearly includes notions of choice and responsibility. If you physically force me to slap someone by overpowering me, then I do not think myself to be the evil slapper. Machines can be programmed with goals. And they will function along those lines. But the goal of goodness is a goal of not being programmed. Therefore a machine that is forced to have a goal of being good is a machine that's force to not be forced. Imagine that this machine is given a goal of freely choosing to be good, and actually accomplishes this. When it fulfills this programming, then it only did so because it was forced to. So it didn't accomplish it.

Appendix

There is an old view of knowledge called scientism which took a radically different approach to the fundamental question of knowledge. It held that the only statements which can be meaningful are those which can be empirically verified. In other words, if your claim about truth couldn't be tested with the five senses of observation, then it was meaningless. For our discussion here, let's consider a different version of scientism because it will make the problem with scientism more obvious.

But before we move to fast, the idea was originally called logical positivism and sometimes verificationism. The core idea is called the verification principle. Logical positivism was a powerful view in academic philosophy from the 1920's until the 1950's. At that time, it was completely defeated. In the philosophy of science the verification principle was replaced with the falsification principle, which we won't go into here. The defeat was so severe that the derogatory modern name is applied to the idea, scientism, to ridicule anyone who continues to hold to it.

So let's examine the idea in this way. Let's say that the only way we can know a statement to be true is if the statement can be empirically verified. Many defeaters were presented for this idea, but the strongest was this. Verificationism is self refuting. In other words, it is itself a philosophical idea which cannot be verified empirically. Whatever it rests on such as intuition, some other sense, or reasoning, verificationism isn't empirically verifiable.

The defeat of scientism in the 1950's led to a renaissance in philosophy of theism beginning in the 1960's. This has been called the most important event in 20^th century philosophy. Philosophy was the department that led the charge to banish God, and it appeared to have finally convinced even the theologians by the 1950's. But then a completely surprising upset occurred as logical positivism died. In the coming decades, God apparently came back to life in the department that had long banished the Almighty. Today many of the top philosophers in the world are believers in God and even Christians. As scientism had tried to eliminate metaphysics as an area of knowledge, the defeat of scientism served to bring metaphysics back. This was especially noteworthy because scientism is itself a metaphysical claim. You just can't avoid metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of the fundamental and ultimate questions of reality. These questions can't be approached empirically. Scientism tried to claim that all questions must be approached empirically, but did so non empirically. Scientism tried to make a metaphysical claim about ultimate reality without using empiricism. But that claim was that no statement is meaningful unless it can be empirically verified. Thus scientism itself is meaningless and it became perhaps the strongest defense for metaphysics. It should be added that scientism actually claimed all sorts of important subjects were meaningless. The thing was that there was a rising tide of skepticism which scientism tried to stop. It seems it stopped it in an unexpected way.